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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STA TE 0¥' UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : \latw Un, " >l .na 3 S-CA . 
vs. : 
CHRISTIAN 11 , MAYF1K!,,!*, : ' ;, 
Priority No. 10 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This A ^ J., } eci i t r^m an interlocutory order deny i ng 
defendant-' s motion r -uporesF evidence/ following a hearing in the 
First Judicial _ , L . . , 1 ai id f :>:i : Box EJ de:i : O : >i mty, State of 
Utah, the Honorable Ben H. Hadfield, presiding. 
*• : -
 !
 • Lu near this case 
pursuant ' .: " », • o >: Ann. Sec. /^ -^ rt-.'> • .• •. Fupp. 1994). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED AND 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The foi lowing I'.^ ue i:» pi esented on .ippt-iii, 
1. Did the trial court err in denying defendant's Motion to 
- -
 w a s unlawfu. " y - continued 
detention ai.u : «- '|.»rrtiwiii!iu oi defendants exceeded ".he scope of 
the initial stop, and the consent to search was obtained by police 
exploitation of the prior i llegality? , . ^ 
Standard of Appellate Review: The factual findings underlying 
1 
the trial court's decision with respect to a motion to suppress 
evidence are reviewed under the deferential "clearly erroneous" 
standard. State v. Pena, 232 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, at 8 n. 4 (Utah 
1994); accord State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1272 (Utah 1993). 
Furthermore, the "determination of whether a specific set of facts 
gives rise to reasonable suspicion is a determination of law and is 
reviewable nondeferentially for correctness." Pena, 232 Utah Adv. 
Rep. at 6; Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1272. (This mixed standard of 
review is also applicable to the trial court's determination of 
voluntary consent). The Court in Pena stated that "the reasonable-
suspicion legal standard is one that conveys a measure of 
discretion to the trial judge when applying that standard to a 
given set of facts. Precisely how much discretion we cannot say . 
. . ." Pena, 232 Utah Adv. Rep. at 6. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The Appellant identifies the following constitutional 
provisions, statutes, ordinances and rules as those "whose 
interpretation is determinative" within the meaning of Utah R. App. 
P. 24(a) (6) : 
AMENDMENT IV 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported 
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
j •,.-..• •
 o n October 25, 1995, charging 
defendant with possession of a controlled substance, a third degree 
felony, ±11 violation of Section ^H-*W--M , *./-. :-*[,5 as 
amended) , possession of * r-on^  : .,-_*- .. -* -.« B 
misdemeanor, -h • lol^non of Section 5 8 - I 7 - H (2BIIT T / - , A . (1953 
as amen r- < - - . . . . -:i ! >-r <; ' '« "" B 
misdemeanor , i -io-ation of Section 58-37A-5-". , .J..-. (1953 as 
amen*:*-": • //oresb evidence * ^ c' ^" &<i on 
November ^ , JH^-
 r < . ^ i , . . f :] K i ri hearing was ne^a December 
6, l^r^o. vTranscrir' located v •- .: : - » *• December * r, 1^95, 
the trial court 'issued an order denying tl le motioi :i 
A Petition for Permission to Appeal was filed on December -,6, 1995, 
and granted on h^ L>i I id i y I, 1M'H,. .• : • .- . . • • •• • • 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
;
 ' '
?
' ' 2 t I Octobei • 1 S • ] 995 T. t: T:M >per Sec )tt : S. i i lgJ e t :c > i: i c )f the I Jtah 
Highway Patrol was patrolling the southern portion of Box Elder 
-, -estate 15. As he was traveling south, near the port 
*.--" ei: :-y, * ;,- rrooper noti ced a vehicle traveling : L.\e :e: . -j,.e 
in front of him. The vehicle contained \* ."individuals, a:id the 
driver, deleiiil.ini Mdyiieitl (hcrei na: v -.• * - ~t 
wearing a sea~ i^. * As fv- trooper followed the car, he watched 
«^
; s
 • I r^cure ^^s seat 
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belt. 
As Mayfield was attempting to fasten his seat belt, the car 
began to drift over the fog line to the left. Mayfield corrected 
back into his lane. (R. at 43 line 5 to 44 line 12) . After 
proceeding for another approximately one half mile during which the 
trooper observed no further weaving (R. at 65 line 21 to 66 line 
7) , the trooper pulled the vehicle over with the intention of 
informing the driver that he should secure his seat belt before 
commencing to operate his vehicle. (R. at 44 line 13-17; 66 line 
1-14) . The trooper had no suspicion of driver impairment due to 
alcohol or controlled substances. (R. at 54 line 11 to 55 line 3; 
66 line 4-11). 
The trooper ran a stolen vehicle check, which was negative, 
and in fact admitted he had no suspicion that the vehicle had been 
stolen. (R. at 55 line 4-11). The trooper contacted the driver 
(Mayfield), and asked him for his license and registration, neither 
of which Mayfield could produce. Mayfield informed the trooper 
that he did not have a valid license, but that the passenger did 
have one. (R. at 45 line 1-10) . The vehicle registration was 
later found in the trunk area of the vehicle. (R. at 54 line 7-
10) . 
The trooper testified that Mayfield told him he had a warrant 
out for his arrest, but that he did not find one. (R. at 45 line 
7-8, 18-21). The trooper admitted that Mayfield could simply have 
been ordered by a court to appear at jail. (R. at 70 line 23 to 71 
4 
line 4) . 
The trooper had Mayfield exit the vehicle and frisked him. 
(R. at 56 line 1-7). No weapons or contraband were found. The 
trooper then had Mayfield sit in the vehicle while he contacted the 
passenger, Jeffery Cummings (the co-defendant, hereinafter referred 
to as "Cummings") . (R. at 45 line 9-13) . The trooper had 
Cummings exit the vehicle and frisked him. (R. at 45 line 21-22; 
56 line 8-12). No weapons or contraband were found. 
Cummings correctly identified himself and produced a valid 
driver's license. (R. at 67 line 16-23). As Cummings handed his 
license to the trooper, the trooper noticed Cummings' hands were 
trembling. (R. at 45 line 21-24; 56 line 13-19). When the trooper 
asked Cummings why he was shaking, he stated that he wasn't used to 
getting stopped by cops. Due to Cummings' nervousness, the trooper 
suspected there may be either a weapon or contraband concealed in 
the vehicle. (R. at 45 line 25 to 46 line 5; 57 line 1-7). 
The trooper asked Cummings if there was anything in the car 
that he needed to be aware of, to which Cummings responded 
negatively. (R. at 46 line 15-19; 57 line 8-13). The trooper then 
had Cummings stand toward the front of the vehicle to limit his 
access to the vehicle's interior. (R. at 57 line 14-19). The 
trooper also indicated that at that point Cummings was not free to 
leave. (R. at 57 line 20-25). 
The trooper then walked back to the driver's side and 
contacted Mayfield. He advised Mayfield that Cummings behavior was 
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making the trooper nervous. The trooper testified that because of 
Cummings1 nervousness, he "knew" that there was either contraband 
or weapons in the vehicle. (R. at 60 line 17-25) . The trooper 
then asked Mayfield if there was anything in the car that he needed 
to be aware of, to which Mayfield answered in the negative. (R. at 
46 line 21-25). The trooper then asked if Mayfield would mind if 
he looked in the vehicle to make sure. Mayfield did not consent, 
but rather began to explain that the passenger always gets nervous. 
(R. at 58 line 17 to 59 line 3). 
The trooper then told Mayfield that Cummings' behavior was not 
normal. He then asked, again, if he could look in the car for 
weapons or contraband. Mayfield did not answer. The trooper then 
asked if there was a weapon in the vehicle, to which Mayfield 
answered, "No." The trooper then asked, again, if Mayfield would 
mind if he looked in the vehicle. At that point Mayfield stated, 
"I don't care." (R. at 59 line 9 to 60 line 2). 
The trooper then had Mayfield join Cummings near the front of 
the vehicle and he proceeded to search the vehicle. (R. at 47 
line 23-25). During his search, the trooper found marijuana, drug 
paraphernalia, and methamphetamine. (R. at 47 line 25 to 48 line 
3; 49 at line 5-8). The methamphetamine was found in a fanny pack, 
which Cummings admitted belonged to him. (R. at 49 line 2-10) . 
Mayfield approached the trooper and stated that the pack was his. 
(R. at 49 line 12-16). Mayfield later told the trooper that it did 
not belong to him. (R. at 51 line 15-24). 
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An information was filed against both defendants charging them 
with possession of the items found during the search. Motions to 
Suppress the evidence were filed1 and an evidentiary hearing was 
held on December 6, 1995. The trial judge, Honorable Ben H. 
Hadfield, took the motion under advisement, then issued a 
Memorandum Decision on December 15, 1995, denying the Motions. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The initial stop was unlawful and any evidence obtained 
thereafter should have been excluded. In order to comply with the 
Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, the State must establish that the stop in question was 
either (1) incident to a traffic violation committed in the 
officer's presence, or (2) based on specific, articulable facts and 
reasonable inferences derived from these facts that would lead a 
reasonable officer to conclude that the occupant of the vehicle had 
committed, or was about to commit a crime. The State could not 
establish that the stop was initiated based on either circumstance. 
There was no traffic violation committed in the officer's 
presence. While the State may argue that the one incident of 
weaving violated Section 41-6-1(1) Utah Code Annotated (1953 as 
amended), an examination of all the facts, as well as a comparison 
to a similar case (State v. Bello, 871 P.2d 584 (Utah App. 1994), 
xThe Motion to Suppress not only applied to the physical 
evidence obtained, but to the statements made by the defendants 
as well. (R. at 51 line 25 to 52 line 7). 
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shows that there was no violation. Moreover, by the trooper's own 
admission he did not suspect any criminal activity on the part of 
the defendants. 
Once a Fourth Amendment seizure has occurred, any detention 
for reasons exceeding the scope of the original stop and not 
reasonably related to the circumstances justifying the stop in the 
first place, is illegal. The continued detention and the 
questioning of defendants exceeded the scope of the stop and the 
evidence should have been suppressed. 
While Mayfield did give consent to the search, it was not 
given voluntarily. Additionally, it was obtained by exploitation 
of the prior illegality (the continued detention and questioning). 
Mayfield's Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and 
seizures was violated and the evidence and statements obtained 
should have been suppressed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE INITIAL STOP WAS UNLAWFUL 
AND ANY EVIDENCE OBTAINED THEREAFTER 
SHOULD HAVE BEEN EXCLUDED 
It is by now well established that the Fourth Amendment 
applies to investigatory stops of vehicles "regardless of the 
reason for the stop or the brevity of the detention." State v. 
Talbot, 792 P.2d 489, 491 (Utah App. 1990) (citing Delaware v. 
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S. Ct. 1391, 1395 (1979); accord 
State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 975 (Utah App. 1988), overruled in 
8 
part on other grounds by State v. Arrovo, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990). 
In order to comply with the Fourth Amendment's prohibition 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, the State must 
establish that the stop in question was either (1) incident to a 
traffic violation committed in the officer's presence, or (2) based 
on specific, articulable facts and reasonable inferences derived 
from these facts that would lead a reasonable officer to conclude 
that the occupant of the vehicle had committed, or was about to 
commit a crime- State v. Lopez, 831 P.2d 1040, 1042 (Utah App.), 
cert, granted, 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992); Talbot, 792 P.2d at 491; 
Sierra, 754 P.2d at 975. 
The State may claim that the trooper's stopping of the vehicle 
in this case was incident to a traffic violation committed in the 
trooper's presence. Defendant concedes that his vehicle drifted 
slightly over the fog line (off the freeway, not into the other 
lane of traffic) when he fastened his seat belt. The trooper 
admitted at the suppression hearing that he observed this and that 
it was obviously the reason the vehicle briefly drifted. He also 
admitted that the driver quickly corrected the vehicle back into 
his lane. 
After following the vehicle for another half mile, the trooper 
observed no other incidents of weaving. There is no evidence of 
other vehicles in danger. The trooper also testified that he had 
no suspicion whatsoever that the driver was impaired in any way, or 
that the vehicle had been stolen. The trooper's testimony was that 
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his sole intention was to advise the driver that he should fasten 
his seat belt before operating a vehicle; he did not say he was 
going to warn the driver that he had violated Utah Code Annotated 
Section 41-6-61(1) (1953 as amended), which requires that a vehicle 
be operated "as nearly as practical entirely within a single lane," 
If we compare this case to State v. Bello, 871 P.2d 584 (Utah 
App. 1994), we find that it is likely Mayfield did not violate 
Section 41-6-61(1). In Bello, the defendant was driving a truck 
with a camper in windy conditions. The officer observed the 
defendant's truck weave once. The officer followed the defendant 
for another 2 miles and observed no further weaving. The Court in 
Bello held that the stop was unlawful. 
While in the instant case the cause of Mayfield1 s brief 
drifting was not the wind, but rather was his effort at securing 
his seat belt, this case may still be properly analogized to Bello. 
In Bello, as in this case, the officer observed only one incident 
of drifting. In both cases the officers followed the defendants 
for some distance afterward and observed no further drifting or 
weaving. In Bello, the State based its claim of reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity on the single incident of weaving 
witnessed by the officer. The court found that in light of the 
totality of the circumstances, that fact was inadequate to justify 
the stop of the defendant's vehicle. The officer's "initial 
suspicion, triggered by a minor driving aberration, was not 
corroborated in any way during the ensuing pursuit." (Bello at 
10 
587) . 
Here, the trooper, by his own admission, had no suspicion 
whatsoever of driver impairment, which would be the only 
conceivable suspicion under the circumstances. Indeed, "[a]s the 
Tenth Circuit recently noted, NIf failure to follow a perfect 
vector down the highway . . . were sufficient reason to suspect a 
person of driving while impaired, a substantial portion of the 
public would be subject each day to an invasion of their privacy.'" 
(Id-) (quoting United States v. Lyon, No. 93-4079, slip op. at 7 
(10th Circ. Nov. 2, 1993). 
There were no specific, articulable facts and reasonable 
inferences to be derived from these facts that would lead a 
reasonable officer to conclude that the occupant of the vehicle had 
committed, or was about to commit a crime. The trooper's testimony 
at the suppression hearing clearly indicates that he did not have 
any suspicions of criminal activity prior to pulling the vehicle 
over. The trooper had no constitutional basis for stopping 
Mayfield's vehicle. Therefore, the stop was unlawful, and any 
evidence obtained thereafter should have been excluded pursuant to 
State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 472 (Utah 1990) (plurality opinion) . 
POINT II 
THE DETENTION AND QUESTIONING OF DEFENDANTS 
EXCEEDED THE SCOPE OF THE STOP AND 
WERE THEREFORE ILLEGAL 
If this Court finds the initial stop to be lawful, it should 
then consider whether the continued detention and the questioning 
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of the defendants exceeded the scope of the initial stop. 
"Once a Fourth Amendment seizure has occurred, any detention 
for reasons exceeding the scope of the original stop and not 
reasonably related to the circumstances justifying the stop in the 
first place, is illegal." State v. Godina-Luna, 826 P.2d 652, 654 
(Utah App. 1992) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1968); 
State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431 (Utah. App. 1990). "The length and 
scope of the detention must be sstrictly tied to and justified byf 
the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible." 
State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 761, 763 (Utah 1991) (quoting Terry, 392 
U.S. at 19-20, 88 S.Ct. at 1879). 
Once the reasons for the initial stop have been satisfied, the 
individual must be allowed to proceed on his or her way. Any 
further temporary detention for investigative questioning after the 
fulfillment of the purpose for the initial traffic stop is 
justified under the Fourth Amendment only if the detaining officer 
has a reasonable suspicion of serious criminal activity. Robinson, 
797 P.2d at 435; State v. Ziealeman, 276 Utah Adv. Rep. 56 (Utah 
App. 1995). 
The record from the suppression hearing indicates the 
defendants were not free to leave because the trooper had the 
defendants exit the vehicle and stand away from it; they were on 
the freeway (Interstate 15) and the trooper testified that the 
defendants were in fact not free to leave. Therefore, in view of 
all of the circumstances, the defendants were seized under the 
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Fourth Amendment, United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 
100 S.Ct. 1870, 1877 (1980); State v. Jackson, 806 P.2d 765, 767 
(Utah App. 1990). 
The trooper in this case, in pulling the vehicle over, 
intended to simply inform the driver that he should secure his seat 
belt prior to driving. This he did, or had the opportunity to. 
The Court must therefore consider whether the trooper had a 
reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity justifying 
further detention of the defendants. Robinson, 797 P.2d at 435. 
There is nothing in this case which supports a reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity. The fact that Mayfield informed 
the trooper that he had to report to jail that evening is only 
perhaps indicative of some past criminal behavior which had already 
been adjudicated to some degree. 
Furthermore, the fact that Cummings was nervous does not raise 
a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Id. at 436. Utah 
appellate courts have previously held that nervous conduct can be 
afforded no weight in determining a detaining officer's reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity. State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181, 
184 (Utah 1987); State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 976 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988), overruled on other grounds. State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684 
(Utah 1990). 
Although the trooper testified that he "knew" there was 
criminal activity being carried out, by his own admission it was 
based on the nervousness of the passenger, Cummings. This amounts 
13 
to nothing more than a hunch, and while this "hunch ultimately 
proved to be correct, a hunch, without more, does not raise a 
reasonable articulable suspicion regardless of the final result." 
Godina-Luna, 826 P.2d at 655 (citing Johnson, 805 P.2d at 764) 
(Citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 27, 88 S.Ct. at 1883)). 
This Court recently decided a case with similar facts in 
Ziealeman, 27 6 Utah Adv. Rep. 56. In Ziealeman, the trooper 
pulled the vehicle over to issue the driver a warning for speeding. 
The defendant produced a driver's license, but could not produce a 
vehicle registration. The trooper suspected the vehicle may have 
been stolen, but an NCIC check showed the vehicle was not stolen. 
The trooper asked if there were any weapons or narcotics in the 
vehicle. 
He had the vehicle's two passengers exit the vehicle so he 
could search it, pursuant to obtaining consent from the driver. As 
the defendants exited, the trooper noted that the passenger 
exhibited extreme nervousness, which further reinforced his 
suspicion of criminal activity. This Court held in Ziealeman that 
the question as to whether there were any weapons or narcotics in 
the vehicle was illegal (as it obviously exceeded the scope of the 
initial stop). 
In its decision, the Ziealeman court discussed a Tenth Circuit 
case with similar facts. United States v. Walker, 933 F.2d 812 
(10th cir. 1991), cert, denied, 502 U.S. 1093, 12 S.Ct. 1168 
(1992). In Walker, the officer stopped the defendant for speeding. 
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An NCIC check showed the vehicle was not stolen. When the officer 
asked the defendant for his driver's license and vehicle 
registration, he noticed that the defendant was so nervous that his 
hands shook. The officer asked the defendant if he had any open 
containers of alcohol or controlled substances in the vehicle. The 
officer obtained consent to search and found 8 6 grams of cocaine. 
The court in Walker found that the officer's continued detention of 
the defendant beyond the time required to receive the information 
needed to issue a speeding citation constituted an unreasonable 
seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 816. 
Similarly, in this case the trooper's detention exceeded the 
amount of time it would reasonably take to warn Mayfield to fasten 
his seat belt prior to operating his vehicle, and therefore 
constituted an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment. 
Moreover, the question as to whether there were narcotics or 
weapons in the vehicle was not based on reasonable suspicion and 
was therefore illegal. 
POINT III 
THE EVIDENCE SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED 
BECAUSE DEFENDANT'S CONSENT TO SEARCH WAS 
NOT VOLUNTARY AND WAS OBTAINED 
BY EXPLOITATION OF THE PRIOR ILLEGALITY 
To show consent to search was lawfully obtained following an 
officer's illegal seizure, the State must prove the consent was (1) 
voluntary, and (2) not obtained by exploitation of the prior 
illegality- The evidence must meet both tests to be admissible. 
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State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 688 (Utah 1990). 
A. CONSENT WAS NOT VOLUNTARY. 
The first test is whether the consent was given voluntarily. 
The trooper, who had just pulled Mayfield and Cuinmings over on 
Interstate 15, was wearing a uniform and weapon, and had the 
defendants exit the vehicle and stand away from it. The defendants 
were clearly not free to leave, and the trooper freely admitted so 
at the suppression hearing. The trooper twice asked Mayfield if 
there were any weapons or contraband in the vehicle, and requested 
three times of Mayfield if he could search the vehicle. Under the 
circumstances, the consent finally given was not done so 
voluntarily. 
B. CONSENT WAS OBTAINED BY EXPLOITATION OF THE PRIOR ILLEGALITY. 
The second test examines whether defendant's consent was the 
product of police exploitation of the illegal stop, "or in other 
words, Nwhether the "taint" of the Fourth Amendment violation was 
sufficiently attenuated to permit introduction of the evidence.1" 
State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1263 (quoting New York v. Harris, 
495 U.S. 14, 19, 110 S.Ct. 1640, 1643-44 (1990)). 
The factors to be considered in an exploitation analysis 
include 1) the temporal proximity of the illegality and the 
consent, 2) the presence of intervening circumstances, and 3) the 
purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 
at 690-691, n. 4. The Court is to consider "whether . . . the 
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evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by 
exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently 
distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint." Wong Sun v. 
United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488, 83 S.Ct. 407, 417 (1963) (quoting 
Maguire, Evidence of Guilt 221 (1959) . The State is therefore 
required to "establish the existence of intervening factors which 
prove that the consent was sufficiently attenuated from the illegal 
stop." Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 691 (quoting United States v. Melendez-
Gonzalez, 727 F.2d 407, 414 (5th Cir. 1984)). 
1. Temporal Proximity 
With respect to temporal proximity, the record shows that very 
little time passed between the initial stop and the numerous 
requests for permission to search the vehicle, as well as the 
illegal question of whether there were weapons or narcotics in the 
vehicle. 
2. Intervening circumstances. 
No intervening factors existed. At no time did Mayfield or 
Cummings leave the scene, nor were they free to, and the consent 
itself was not an intervening circumstance. The consent was 
obtained during an ongoing illegal seizure, thus no time factor 
separated the illegality from the consent. See Ziealeman, 27 6 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 56, and Walker, 933 F.2d 812. 
17 
3. Purpose and flagrancy-
The "purpose and flagrancy" element "directly relates to the 
deterrent value of suppression*" State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 
1263 (citing Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 608-12, 95 S.Ct. 
2254, 2264-66 (Powell, J., concurring)). If the officer is 
engaging in the "misconduct" because, for example, he was relying 
in good faith on a statute which was later invalidated, suppressing 
the evidence obtained would have no deterrent value. That was not 
the case here. At the suppression hearing the State presented no 
evidence that the trooper relied on any statute or case law which 
was later invalidated or overturned. In fact, the case law in 
existence at the time of the arrest is clear as to the propriety of 
the trooper's conduct. See Ziealeman, 276 Utah Adv. Rep. at 58-59. 
The trooper's conduct was not justified by law and suppressing 
the evidence obtained will serve not only as a general deterrent, 
but as a specific deterrent as well. Ziealeman, 276 Utah Adv. Rep. 
at 59 ("[A] court's examination of deterrence must be made with 
reference to law enforcement generally, rather than to one officer 
particularly"). 
The only reasonable conclusion is that there was not 
sufficient attenuation between the unlawful stop (as well as the 
illegal questioning) and Mayfield's consent to search. Therefore, 
the controlled substances and paraphernalia, as well as the 
statements made, should have been excluded pursuant to Larocco, 7 94 
18 
P.2d 460, 472. 
CONCLUSION 
The motions to suppress should have been granted. The trooper 
had no valid reason to initiate a stop on Mayfield's vehicle. Once 
the stop was made, the trooper's continued detention of defendants 
and search of the vehicle exceeded the scope of the initial stop, 
which was, as the trooper testified, solely to advise the driver to 
fasten his seat belt prior to operating his vehicle. Moreover, the 
trooper's questions to defendants as to whether the vehicle 
contained weapons or narcotics exceeded the scope of the stop and 
were not based on any reasonable articulable facts. 
Mayfield's consent to search was not voluntary and was 
obtained through exploitation of prior illegal conduct. Mayfield's 
Fourth Amendment rights were clearly violated and justice demands 
that the evidence obtained illegally be excluded. 
Wherefore, defendant Mayfield respectfully requests this Court 
to reverse the trial court and order that the evidence seized and 
statements made be suppressed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this J^ _ day of June, 1996. 
MICHAEL D. BOUWHUIS 
Attorney for Appellant 
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ADDENDUM A 
1 called as a witness, being first duly sworn to tell 
2 the truth, was examined and testified as follows: 
3 DIRECT EXAMIMATIOn 
4 BY MR. BUNDER SON: 
5 0* Your name is Scott Singleton and you're a 
6 trooper with the Utah Highway Patrol, is that correct? 
7 A. Yes. sir. it is. 
8 0. On October 19th, 19 9 5, it's true that you 
9 were so employed and you were working that day 
10 patrolling in a marked car and in uniform? 
11 A. That's correct. 
12 O . I'll call your attention to the matter before 
13 the court. I understand that at about 2:15 p.m. you 
14 pulled over a vehicle that turned out to contain these 
15 two defendants, Mr. Ma y f i e1d an d Mr. C um m in gs , is that 
16 all c o"r r e c t ? 
17 A. That is correct. 
18 Q . They were the only two people in the vehicle? 
19 A. That's right. 
20 O. Okay. Describe how you came to see the 
21 vehicle., how you had contact with it, and the basis 
22 for pulling it over. I assume you turned on your 
23 lights and the vehicle pulled over? 
24 A. That's correct. 
25 0. And this was on the interstate in Box Elder 
I 
! 
i 
i 
i 
1 Coun ty? | 
2 A. Yes, sir. j 
3 Q. Go ahead. J 
4 A. I was traveling southbound near the Port of j 
5 Entry in the early afternoon. I noticed a vehicle 
6 : traveling in front of me. It was in the left lane, 
7 the fast lane, southbound. I noticed that the driver ! 
i 
8 wasn't wearing a sear. belt. As I followed the vehicle i 
! 
j 
9 for some distance, the driver reached up and got ahold j 
10 of the seat belt and started to attempt to fasten it. 
11 As he did that the vehicle began to weave across the 
12 fog line. Then it corrected back onto the highway. 
13 That's when I activated my lights, pulled 
14 over the vehicle and I planned to tell the driver if 
15 you're going to wear a seat belt put it on before you 
16 start driving. If you need to, pull over and put it 
17 on . That's what my intentions were. 
18 I followed the vehicle just south of the 
19 Port of Entry and approached and contacted Mr. 
20 Mayfield behind the wheel. 
21 O. Now, let me interject one thing. It is an 
22 : offense under Utah law for a person in the front seat 
23 of a car, adult or not, to fail to wear a seat belt? 
24 ; A. That is correct. 
25 0. Okay. Go ahead* 
1 A. So T approached the driver's side and asked 
2 the individual, for a driver's license and 
3 registration. He didn't have a driver's license with 
4- him..- didn't have any identification, so I asked him to 
5 step out. We talked about the driver's license for a 
5 minute and he told me that he did not have a valid 
7 license. At that time he told me he had a warrant out 
8 o n h i m , too, 
9 I asked him if the passenger had a valid 
10 driver's license and he told me that he did. I had 
11 the driver sit back in his seat and went to the 
12 passenger and had him step out of the vehicle and 
13 asked him for identification. 
14 O. Okav. Who was the driver? 
1.5 
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A. He said his name was Christian H. ?<f a y f i e 1 d . 
O. Okav. That turned out to be correct? 
17 A . That was correct, yes, sir. 
18 Q. And the driver told you he didn't have a 
19 . l i c e n s e and t h e r e was a w a r r a n t o u t s t a n d i n a for him? 
20 He said t h e r e was a w a r r a n t , b u t I n e v e r 
21 f o u n d o n e . I w e n t to the p a s s e n g e r s i d e and asked him 
2 2 to s t e p out and then a s k e d for i d e n t i f i c a t i o n . He was 
23 handing me his driver's license and his hand was 
24 trembling qui t e badly. It made me quite nervous and 
2 5 so I a s k e d him w h y he was t r e m b l i n g . He said he 
wasn't used to being stopped by the cops. Well, I've 
stopped a lot of people and as bad as he was shaking 
it made me quite nervous, you know, rhat perhaps 
something was wrong. So I asked him if there were any 
weapons or contraband in the vehicle. 
0 . Are you saying that although many people are 
nervous when pulled over — 
A . It's common. I even get nervous when I'm 
pulled over. 
0. But there was something unusual about this 
one ? 
A. The amount of nervousness was far beyond what 
you normally see. 
0 . Okay. So you then asked him something? 
A. I asked him if there were any weapons or 
contraband in the vehicle. I'm not sure if I asked - -
exactly how I asked him, but I asked if there was 
anything in the vehicle that I needed to be aware of 
and he told me no. I patted him down for weapons and 
had him stand in front of the vehicle. 
Then I went back over to the driver, Mr. 
Mayfield, and asked him - - I told him that the 
passenger's nervousness was making me uneasy, nervous, 
and I asked if there was anything in the vehicle, 
weapons or contraband. He told me no. I asked him if 
1 he would mind if T searched the vehicle for weapons or 
2 contraband. He said I don't care. 
3 O. Okay. Let's see. We have the driver's name? 
d A. Yes. Mayfield. 
5 0. And the passenger was? 
6 A. Jeffrey Cummings. 
7 O. Okay. And that's the two individuals seated 
8 here today, is that correct? 
9 A. Ye s , sir. 
10 MR. SNIDER: Your Honor, for identification 
11 purposes I think we'll stipulate that the defendant 
12 sitting next to my left is Mr. Cummings. Mr. 
13 Bouwhuis's client, Mr. Mayfield, is sitting next to 
14 him. 
15 (BY NfR . BUNDERSOM) Is that correct? 
16 A. That is correct 
17 O . All riaht. At this ooint.. then, the driver 
18 said I don't care? 
19 A. Yes 
20 O. Were you alone? 
21 A. I was alone, yes, sir 
22 
23 i 
O. Go ahead• 
A. So I had Mr. Mayfield stand in front of the 
24 vehicle also while I searched the inside of the 
25 vehicle. Between the seats T saw a metal pipe to 
1 smoke marijuana with. Next to it was a prescription 
2 plastic bottle. Tnsi.de was a quantity of plant 
3 material which I recognized to be marijuana. 
4 0 . Describe the configuration of the seats and 
5 how you were able to see these items. 
6 A. It's a Mustang with bucket seats. It was 
7 between the seats, between the two bucket seats. 
8 That's where the pipe was laying. 
9 0 . Was there actually a console between the 
10 seats? 
11 A. Mo, not that T remember. I don't remember a 
12 console, T just remember between the two seats in the 
13 front oart. 
14 O . O k a v 
15 A. That's where I found the oipe and the 
16 container that had marijuana in it. 
17 O. Now, if I understand right, you asked to 
18 enter the car in order to see these items? 
19 
20 
21 
A . Yes, through the driver side. 
0. But you didn't open anything or open a door? 
A. Mo, sir. It was from feeling in the driver's 
22 ! seat and it was visible between the seats. 
23 : 
| 
2 4 i 
0. Okay. Go ahead. 
A. So I went to the oassenaer side, found a 
25 ! black fanny type pack. I unzipped it and there was a 
1 knife, inside, a larae knife 
2 0 . Excuse me. Where was this black fanny pack? 
3 A. On the passenger side on the floor board. 
d Q . You found a knife inside than? 
5 A. Yes. As T opened it further there was a 
6 package of cigarettes and in the cellophane of the 
7 package of cigarettes was a small baggie of whitish 
3 substance which appeared to be m. ethamphetamine. I 
9 asked whose pack it was and the passenger.. Mr. 
10 Cummings, said that it was his. 
11 0 . Okay. 
12 A. So I took Mr. Cummings and told him he was 
13 under arrest for possession of a controlled substance. 
14 As I was handcuffing him, Mr. Mayfield came up to me 
15 and said, officer, that pack is mine. So I advised 
16 him that, that's fine, T can arrest you for it also. 
17 So then I took Mr. - - both Cummings a jn d 
13 Mayfield into custody and then continued the search. 
19. Tn a day planner, which Mr. Cummings said he owned.. 
20 that belonged to him
 f I found another small bag with a 
21 crushed whitish substance which again appeared to be 
22 methamphetamine. Also, on the passenger seat, between 
23 the fold, where the front seat tips forward and the 
24 bottom seat, I found a baggie, a plastic bag, 
25 containing a quantity of plant material which appeared 
•1 A. res, sir. 
2 0 . Where was the day planner? 
3 A. I believe it was on the hood of the car. 
4 0. On the hood of the car? 
5 A. Yes. Mr. Cummings had it — had some papers 
6 or identification things inside the day planner, 
7 Q. Okay. 
8 A. I believe, at the time when T found it, it 
9 was on the hood. 
10 0. Okay, And then a baggie of marijuana in the 
11 crack of the fold of the oassenaer seat? 
12 
13 
14 
15 
yes, sir 
0. Okay. Was there anything else seized? 
No, sir. there wasn't. 
Were there any additional admissions by 
16 either of the defendants 
t J m m . as far as ownership, no 
1 8 O. Related to these charaes 
19. A. Mo. After T'd taken Mr. Mavfield into 
20 custody, he later asked me why did you arrest me and 
21 explained it to him and he then said that really 
2 2 wasn't m v stuff. 
23 0. Yet at the scene he said it was? 
24 
25 
A. Yes. 
MR. BUNDERSON: I assume the supression motion, 
1 counsel; goes to r.he i. t e m s I've j ' i s t described? 
2 MR. SNIDER: Corracr. 
3 MR. BOUUHUTS: That's correct. ;? well as any 
4 s t a t e m e n t s that were m a d e . 
5 MR. BUNDER SON: And statements, yes. Okay. I 
6 think that lays it out, Your Honor, in terms of the 
7 factual basis for this. 
8 O. (BY MR. BUNDERSON) Scott, is there anything 
S that I've failed to ask you or any fact we have failed 
10 to discuss? 
11 
12 
13 
14 
Nothina I can think of riaht now 
MR. BUNDERSON: Okav. That's all I hav; 
THE COURT: Mr. Snider. 
MR. SNIDER: Actuallv, Your Honor, I believe Mr 
15 Bonwhuis will a o first. 
16 THE COURT: -11 riaht. Go ahead 
1.7 CROSS-PY A MT MATIO M 
18 RY MR. BOUWHUTS 
19 O. Are vou called troooer or officer? 
20 A . Either one 
21 I'll be resoectful. Troooer Sinaletcn, you 
22 were following this vehicle at approximately 2:15 in 
23 the afternoon? 
24 A. Somewhere around there, yes, sir 
25 O. And the weather was clear? 
0. Okay. He was not able to produce a valid 
driver's license? 
A. No. sir 
0 2\nd in fact told von that he did not have a 
driver's license? 
A. That's correct. 
0 . You were able to obtain a valid registration 
of the vehicle? 
A. Sometime later. I believe it was found in 
the trunk area. We didn't find it until much later. 
Q. All right. At the time you were following 
the vehicle, I gather from your testimony today and 
from the contents of the report, a copy of the report 
that I have received, that you did not suspect the 
driver was operating under the influence of alcohol? 
A. No, sir. 
0. Did you run — I'm sorry. Go ahead. 
A. Just that he should put his seat belt on 
before operating the vehicle. 
Q. You didn't suspect any alcohol use? 
A- No. 
Q. And you didn't ask him if he'd been using 
alcohol? 
A. No. 
Q. You didn't smell alcohol? 
No, sir, I did not. 
0. Mo slurred speech? 
A, No, sir. 
0. Did vou run a check on the car to see if it 
wa s stolen? 
A. I believe I did, but it didn't show anything 
Q. And you didn't even suspect it was stolen? 
A. No, sir, I didn't. 
O . You would have been surprised if you would 
have found it was stolen? 
A. Yes. sir. 
0. Now, your report indicates that you had the 
driver exit — do you have a copy of your report? 
A. Not with me, no, sir. 
MR. BOUWHUTS: May I approach, Your Honor? 
THE COURT: You may. 
0. (BY MR. BOUWHUIS) Trooper Singleton, I'm 
going to show you a copy of the report that I've 
received. Does this look like the report you filed? 
A. Yes, sir, it does. 
0. Okay. That's got your name at the top? 
A. Uh-huh. 
0. I'm looking down on paragraph seven of the 
report. Does that indicate that you -- let me see it 
again for a moment. 
(Pause.) Excuse me. I'm looking at 
paragraph five. Does that indicate that you had the 
driver exit the vehicle? 
A . Yesf ?.ir. 
O. Okav. And that vou also frisked him at tha 
time? 
A * Ye s, s i r . 
Q. Skipping down to paragraph seven, does that 
indicate that you had the passenger exit the car? 
A. Ye s , sir. 
Q. And that you frisked him? 
A. Yes , sir. 
0. Okay. Thank you. At the time you had the 
passenger, who turned out to be Mr. Cummings, exit t 
car, you had him hand -- he handed you his driver's 
license? 
A. Yes. 
0. And his hand was shaking? 
A. Trembling quite badly. 
0. He appeared to be very nervous? 
A. Yes, sir. 
O. You also testified that it has been your 
experience, when you pull people over, that they're 
quite nervous? 
A. Different types of nervous, yes. 
But in your opinion Mr. Cummings was 
2 extraordinarily nervous? 
3 A. Yes, sir. 
4 0. And your report indicates that you then 
5 became suspicious that there may be a weapon or 
6 ; contraband in the vehicle? 
7 A. Yes, sir. 
8 Q , So at that point you asked the passenger if 
9 there was anything in the car that you needed to be 
10 aware of? 
11 
12 . 
1 3 i 
14 ) 
16 
17 
19 
20 
21 
A - Yes. sir. 
O . And he said no? 
A. He said there wasn't, yes. sir. 
O . Okav. Then vou had him stand toward the 
15 front of the vehicle? 
A. Uh-huh. 
0. And that was to limit his access to the 
18 : vehicle? 
A. Yes. sir. 
O. So it's fair to say at that point he was not 
free to le ave ? 
2 2 < A. He was not free to leave. T think he was 
I 
23 ! under detention for investigation. I wouldn't want 
24 ! him to walk down the freeway or get in the car and 
i 
2 5! leave, no. 
1 0. You then went over and talked to the driver 
2 who was Mr- May field, and asked him if there was 
3 anything that you needed to be aware of, anything in 
4 i the vehicle that you needed to be aware of, correct? 
5 A. That's correct. 
6 ; 0 • And he stated there was not? 
7 I A . Y e s , sir. 
8 0. And you also had him stand toward the front 
9 ' of the vehicle? 
10 
13 
14 
A. Yes. sir, I did 
11 0. For the same reasons you had Mr. Cummings 
12 : stand toward the front of the vehicle? 
A• Ye s, sir. 
O. So neither one of them was free to leave at 
15 ' that point? 
16; A. Basically, yes, sir. 
17 O. You then asked the driver if he would mind if 
18 : you looked in the vehicle? 
1 9 ; 
20 ; 
21 ! 
A. Prior to that, yes. 
O. Prior to what? 
A. Prior to asking him to stand in front of the 
22 i vehicle. 
23 ' Q, Okay. His response was — according to the 
i 
i 
24 ; report his response was he started to explain why the 
25 | passenger was nervous? 
1 A. Yes. I asked if there was anything in the 
2 vehicle and he said he always gets nervous, but that 
3 wasn't my question. 
4 O. So when you initially asked him if you could 
5 search the car. he didn't say yes? 
6- A. He didn't originally say yes. He didn't 
7 answer the question, actually. He didn't say no 
8 either . 
9 Q. And then you told the driver that the 
10 passenger's behavior was not normal? 
11 A. That's correct. 
12 O. And then vou asked aaain if you could look in 
13 the car for weapons or contraband? 
14* A. Yes., sir. 
15 O. And he did not answer? 
16 A ^  I believe that's correct, if that's in the 
1 7 report. 
18 O. And then you asked him if there was a weapon 
19 . in the car? 
20 A. Yes . 
21 O. And he said no? 
22 
23 
A. That's correct-
O. And then you asked him aaain if he would mind 
24 ' if vou looked in the vehicle? 
25 ! Yes. sir 
1 0. And at that point he stated I don't care? 
2 A. That is correct. 
3 O . Did you issue Mr. Mayfield a citation for not 
4^ wearing a seat belt? 
5 A. I believe T d i d . 
6 0 . You believe you did? 
7 • A. Yes. I'm trying to think. I believe a 
8 warning was issued for improper lane travel at the 
9 nail . 
10 
22 
0. You wouldn't have a copv of that with vou 
11 today? 
12 A . I would in my office, but not with me. 
13 * MR. BOUWHUIS: If I may have a moment, Your 
14 Honor? 
15 THE COURT: Yes. 
16 (Pause in the proceedings.) 
1.7 Q. (BY MR. BOUWHUIS) Basically what you're 
18 trying to tell the court is that because of Mr. 
19 Cummings's extreme nervousness, you had a hunch that 
20 • there was either contraband or weapons in the vehicle 
2 1 , correc t ? 
A. A little more than a hunch. I knew that 
23 there was. From past experience, I could tell from 
! 
I 
24 j his nervousness that something was not right in the 
25 ; vehicle. 
1 Defendants' Exhibit No. 1 or A , however you want to do 
2 that. I would move to have it admitted. 
3 THE COURT: It will be marked as Defendants' 
4 Exhibit No. 1. Tt will be received. 
5 : MR. BUNDERSON: No objection from the State. I 
6 guess T should say other than my objection as to 
7 standing, which doesn't necessarily go to the tape. 
8 MR. SNIDER: It has nothing to do with the 
9 admissibility of the tape. Thank you. 
10 Q. (BY MR. SNIDER) Now, at the very beginning 
11 of this tape it shows you talking on the video and 
12; you're pulling the car over, correct? 
i 
13 ! A• Yes, sir. 
14! O. And the reason why the driving pattern, the 
15 weaving over the fog line, is not on this, is because 
16 the video camera doesn't come on until you turn on 
17 vour overhead liahts? 
18 ; 
19 i 
i -! 
20 ! 
21 ! 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You could turn it on manually also? 
A . Yes. sir. 
0. I want to ask you a few questions about what 
22 ! happened before the video started. You stated on 
23 j direct examination that you said you had followed the 
I 
24 j vehicle for some distance. How long did you follow 
25! the vehicle? 
1 A. Probably a half mile at the most. 
2 0. Were you going southbound on 1-15? 
3 A. Yes, sir. 
4 , 0. During that half a mile period of time did 
5 you notice anything wrong with the driving pattern of 
6 I the vehicle, other than the fact that he weaved as he 
7 ' reached back for his seat belt? 
8 A. No, sir. 
9 0 . Nothing to lead you to believe that he was 
10 i ntoxicated? 
11 A. No, sir. 
12 0. The only reason you pulled him over was to 
13 tell him to out his seat belt? 
14 
15 
A. To put it on before driving. 
O. You could see that his seat belt was on in 
16 the video? 
17 A. Yes , sir. 
18 0. Before you pulled him over? 
19 A. That's correct. 
20 i And Mr. Bunderson asked you whether or not 
21 ; you issued a citation. Or I think his exact question 
i 
! 
22 ; was whether or not you could issue a citation for not 
23 ! wearing a seat belt. 
I 
24 I MR. BUNDERSON: I think I asked whether it was on 
i 
25 | offense under Utah law. The answer to that was yes. 
0 BY MR. SNIDER) Unless I'm mistaken, that 
2 offense is not a stoppable offense, is it? 
3 ; A. It's not a. primary offense, no. sir. 
4 Q . In other words, you could not stop Mr. 
5 1 Mayfield for not wearing a seat belt? 
6 ; A. You're correct. 
7 0 . As I view the video, I believe your testimony 
8* was that you asked the passenger for a driver's 
9 license and his hand was shaking and so then you 
1 0 ; searched him, correct? 
11 A. I got him out and patted him down and asked 
1 2 ! him for — the pat down first and then — 
13 Q. So you got the passenger out, patted him down 
14 ! and then asked him for a driver's license? 
15 » A. Yes. sir. 
16 0. And when he tried to oroduce that his hand 
1 7 wa s shakincr? 
18 
19 
20 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. . • He did produce a license, though? 
A. Yes, sir. 
21 | Q. He did identify himself and the license was 
I 
22 i valid? 
23 
24 
A . Yes, sir. 
Q. What was Mr. Cummings wearing that day, sir? 
25 A. I honestly can't recall exactly. 
Yes . sir 
2 , 0. And he could have easily produced it inside 
3 the car? 
4 ; A. Yes. sir. 
5; 0 . But you asked him to step out of the car? 
6 | A. Yes, sir. That was standard procedure. Just 
7 • to get him away from the other person. To ask him 
8 : some questions, you know, to verify who he was. He 
9 was going to get out anyway if he was going to be 
10 switching places. T got him out and checked him for 
11 safety away from the other person first. 
12 ; 0. For his safety? 
13' A. For my safety. Just check him out, make sure 
14 everything is fine. The driver and passenger would be 
15 switching places. Tf there's a weapon or something 
16 involved. T want to have one person out at a time 
17 rather than have to keep watch on two people. 
18 ; Q. When you say for your safety, at the point 
19 ;.. you pulled this vehicle over was there anything to 
20 j make you believe that your safety would be threatened 
j 
i 
21 ! any more than in a standard traffic stop? 
22 | A. Not at the time of stopping it, no, sir. 
23 
24 
25 
Q. And at the time Mr. Mayfield told you that -• 
he didn't say he had a warrant, he said he had to 
report to the Davis County jail that afternoon? 
1 A. And I assumed it was on a warrant, yes, sir. 
2 0 . It could also be that he was court ordered to 
3
 5 appe ar ? 
4 i A. 
5 | 0. 
i "w 
6 j A . 
Ye s , sir. 
So you assumed he had a warrant? 
Yes. sir. I asked him if he had a warrant 
7 j and he said he did. 
8! 0. He was perfectly honest with you? 
9 ! A. Yes, sir. 
10 1 O . He was perfectly cooperative with you? 
i 
i 
11 \ A. Yes. I didn't have any problems from him. 
i 
12 j 0. And Mr. Cummings was honest with you and told 
13 j you he had a driver's license and produced that 
14 1 license? 
i 
1 5 ; A . Yes, sir. 
16 0. So up until the time you got him out of the 
17 ; vehicle and patted him down, there was really nothing 
18 j unusual about this traffic stop from any other traffic 
! 
i 
19 I stop? 
i 
20 I A. No, sir. The driver was driving without a 
i 
21 I d r i v e r ' s l i c e n s e and the p a s s e n g e r had a l i c e n s e . 
2 2 
23 
24 
25 
which is was a little odd, but other than that, no 
MR. SNIDER: No other questions. 
THE COURT: Any follow-up, Mr. Bunderson? 
MR. BUNDERSON: Yes. Thank you. 
